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ABSTRACT
When outsourcing data to third-party servers, searchable
encryption is an important enabling technique which simul-
taneously allows the data owner to keep his data in en-
crypted form and the third-party servers to search in the
ciphertexts. Motivated by an encrypted email retrieval and
archive scenario, we investigate asymmetric searchable en-
cryption (ASE) schemes which support two special features,
namely message recovery and flexible search authorization.
With this new primitive, a data owner can keep his data
encrypted under his public key and assign different search
privileges to third-party servers. In the security model, we
define the standard IND-CCA security against any outside
attacker and define adapted ciphertext indistinguishability
properties against inside attackers according to their func-
tionalities. Moreover, we take into account the potential
information leakage from trapdoors, and define two trap-
door security properties. Employing the bilinear property
of pairings and a deliberately-designed double encryption
technique, we present a provably secure instantiation of the
primitive based on the DLIN and BDH assumptions in the
random oracle model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data Encryption]: Public Key Cryptosystems
Keywords
Cloud Computing; Data Outsourcing; Searchable Encryp-
tion; Privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
To protect outsourced data and services in the cloud com-
puting environment, cryptographic researchers have devoted
a lot of efforts to searchable encryption techniques. Such
techniques are particularly interesting because they allow
a data owner to encrypt his data and outsource the ci-
pheretxts while still being able to let third-party service
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providers search on his behalf without leaking any unneces-
sary information. Roughly speaking, searchable encryption
schemes fall into two categories. One category is symmet-
ric searchable encryption (SSE) schemes, represented by the
work of Song, Wagner, and Perrig [12]. In this category,
only the data owner can contribute searchable contents. The
other category is asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE)
schemes, represented by the work of Boneh et al. [4]. In this
category, the concept of public key encryption is employed
so that every entity can contribute searchable contents. A
detailed survey and analysis of existing searchable encryp-
tion (both SSE and ASE) schemes can be found in [13].
Motivated by an encrypted email retrieval and archive
scenario, as described below, we investigate ASE schemes
which support two special features: message recovery and
flexible search authorization. The message recovery feature
requires that a ciphertext not only allows the data owner to
recover the plaintext but also allows third-party servers to
search in it. The flexible searchable authorization feature
requires that the data owner can authorize a third-party
server in three different ways: (1) authorize the server to
search any message at the data owner’s interest by assign-
ing a message-dependent trapdoor (i.e. the server can only
determine whether the message encoded in the trapdoor is
equal to the plaintext inside a ciphertext); (2) authorize the
server to search any message at the server’s interests by as-
signing a master trapdoor (i.e. the server can choose a mes-
sage at its will and see whether it is equal to the plaintext
inside any ciphertext); (3) authorize the server to perform
both types of searches. Throughout the paper, we refer to
this new type of ASE schemes as ASE††.
1.1 Encrypted Email Retrieval and Archive
Suppose that Bob is an employee of the company COM
and emails sent to him are required to be encrypted and
stored in an email server managed by COM. Suppose that
Alice wants to send an email to Bob, then she can encrypt
the email using Bob’s public key and send the ciphertext to
COM’s email server. Note that, here, Bob is the owner of
his emails. In practice, the underlying encryption scheme
should satisfy the following requirements.
1. When Bob is traveling around, he may want to selec-
tively retrieve and read his emails from COM’s email
server. Thus, the encryption scheme should allow the
email server to search on Bob’s behalf to identify those
at his interests.
2. A malicious user can send Bob encrypted emails, which
contain malwares or viruses. Thus, the encryption
scheme should allow the email server to scan the en-
crypted emails to identify malicious contents.
3. Bob may change his job over the time, so that he may
want to archive his emails during different jobs in a
cloud server, such as Gmail. Bob can simply forward
all his encrypted emails to the archive server. Later
on, Bob may need to selectively retrieve some of the
emails, therefore, the encryption scheme should allow
the cloud server to search on Bob’s behalf as in the
first requirement.
With an ASE†† scheme, the message recovery feature guar-
antees that only Bob can decrypt the encrypted emails while
he can still authorize the servers to search on his behalf. The
flexible search authorization feature allows Bob to assign a
master trapdoor to COM’s email server so that the latter can
scan malicious contents inside the encrypted emails, and this
feature also allows Bob to assign message-dependent trap-
doors to COM’s email server and the cloud server to search
emails at his interests.
1.2 Related Work
As surveyed in [13], the majority of existing ASE schemes
are index-based, which means that they only aim at support-
ing search over scrambled keywords and typically do not al-
low the data owner to recover the keywords. By definition,
these schemes do not allow the servers to search directly
over the contents, therefore their functionality is far from
what an ASE†† scheme is aimed for. On the other hand, an
ASE†† scheme fulfills the purpose of these index-based ASE
schemes.
Fuhr and Paillier [7] and Hofheinz and Weinreb [8] inves-
tigated the concept of ASE with message recovery. Their
formulations only allow the data owner to assign message-
dependent trapdoors to third-party servers, thus provide less
functionality than ASE††. As to the security models, the au-
thors only consider information leakage from ciphertexts and
allow the servers to easily recover the information encoded
in the trapdoors. In [7], if a match is found then the server
immediately knows the plaintext in the ciphertext, while, in
[8], the to-be-searched message is sent to the server in plain-
text. In practice, this may be regarded as a serious security
weakness.
Ibraimi et al. [9] pushed forward the concept of ASE with
message recovery and proposed a new primitive PKEDS,
namely public key encryption with delegated search. With
a PKEDS scheme, a data owner can authorize third-party
servers in two ways: (1) authorize a server to search any
message at the server’s interests by assigning a master trap-
door; (2) authorize a server to search messages at the data
owner’s interests by assigning message-dependent trapdoors.
In their formulation, authorization (2) implies authorization
(1), because search based on message-dependent trapdoors
also requires a master trapdoor as input. In other words,
the data owner must assign a master trapdoor to a server in
order to ask the latter to perform any search. This fact con-
flicts with the least privilege principle in information secu-
rity and is undesirable. For instance, in the aforementioned
application scenario, Bob may not want to assign a master
trapdoor to the cloud server to let the latter probe all his
emails.
Recently, Tang et al. in [14] refined PKEDS and proposed
a primitive similar to ASE††. However, in their security
model, only IND-CPA security is considered and the notion
of soundness is also weaker than that in this paper.
1.3 Contribution
In this paper, we formulate a new primitive, namely ASE††.
With an ASE†† scheme, the data owner can keep data in
encrypted form while still be able to recover the plaintext
and authorize third-party servers to search on his behalf.
The authorization to a server is through assigning the ap-
propriate trapdoors: message-dependent trapdoors, master
trapdoors, or both types of trapdoors. In contrast to [9],
a search based on a message-dependent trapdoor does not
require a master trapdoor as input, and this implies a signif-
icant security improvement. In practice, the data owner can
authorize different servers based on their trustworthiness.
With respect to the functionality of ASE††, we provide
a comprehensive definition for the soundness property. The
property guarantees that not only the encryption/decryption
algorithms work well but also the decryption and the test
algorithms are bilaterally consistent with each other. We
present a fine-grained security model by considering four cat-
egories of attackers, including an outside attacker and three
types of curious servers based on the trapdoors they receive.
We define the standard IND-CCA security against an out-
side attacker, and define adapted ciphertext indistinguisha-
bility security properties against the curious servers. More-
over, we define two trapdoor security properties to model
the possible information leakages from message-dependent
trapdoors. This security model is stronger than that in [14].
The soundness property turns out to be very difficult to be
satisfied. Hybrid constructions (e.g. [1, 16]) and other con-
structions (e.g. [14]) do not satisfy this property. Based on
bilinear pairing techniques and a deliberately-designed dou-
ble encryption technique, we propose a new ASE†† scheme
and prove its security based on DLIN and BDH assumptions
in the random oracle model.
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we formulate the concept of ASE†† and define
the soundness property. In Section 3, we present a fine-
grained security model for ASE††. In Section 4, we present
an IND-CCA secure scheme and analyse its security. In
Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2. DEFINITION OF ASE††
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation. x||y
means the concatenation of x and y, P.P.T. means proba-
bilistic polynomial time, x ∈R X means that the element
x is chosen from the set X uniformly at random, and x
$
←
A(m1,m2, · · · ;O1,O2, · · · ) means that x is the output of
the algorithm A which runs with the input m1,m2, · · · and
access to the oracles O1,O2, · · · .
2.1 Primitive Formulation
In general, an ASE†† scheme involves the following enti-
ties. In each server category, there can be multiple servers,
but we only consider one for the simplicity of description.
• A data owner, who is supposed to receive encrypted
messages. This entity is also referred to as receiver in
encryption schemes.
• Type-I server S1, which receives message-dependent
trapdoors from the data owner. It can test whether the
message encoded in a trapdoor is equal to the plaintext
inside any given ciphertext.
• Type-II server S2, which receives a master trapdoor
from the data owner. It can choose a message at its
will and test whether it is equal to the plaintext inside
any given ciphertext.
• Hybrid server Sh, which is both Type-I and Type-II.
• Senders, who may send messages to the data owner.
Let λ be the security parameter. Formally, an ASE††
scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• rKeyGen(λ): Run by the data owner, it outputs a pub-
lic/private key pair (PKr, SKr). Let the message space
be denoted as W.
• Encrypt(w,PKr) Run by a message sender, it outputs
a ciphertext cw for a message w ∈ W.
• Decrypt(cw, SKr): Run by the data owner, it outputs
the plaintext w or an error message ⊥.
• sKeyGen(λ): Run by a server (S1, S2, or Sh), it outputs
a public/private key pair (PKs, SKs)
• TrapGen1(w,PKs, SKr): Run by the data owner, it
generates a message-dependent trapdoor tw,s for the
server with public key PKs.
• Test1(cw, tw′,s, SKs): Run by the server with message-
dependent trapdoor tw′,s and private key SKs, it re-
turns 1 if w′ = w and 0 otherwise.
• TrapGen2(PKs, SKr): Run by the data owner, it out-
puts a master trapdoor t∗,s for the server with public
key PKs.
• Test2(cw, w
′, t∗,s, SKs): Run by the server with the
master trapdoor t∗,s and private key SKs, it returns 1
if w′ = w and 0 otherwise.
Note that (rKeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) define a standard
PKE scheme. As indicated in [4], the trapdoors should be
transmitted to the servers through a secure channel (with
confidentiality), otherwise any attacker will be able to obtain
the trapdoors and search over the ciphertexts. However,
this issue has not been formally addressed in the primitive
formulation and security model in [4]. Here, we explicitly
provide the sKeyGen algorithm so that potential servers can
run this algorithm to generate a key pair, with which the
data owner can generate trapdoors in an encrypted form by
running the TrapGen1 and TrapGen2 algorithms.
2.2 Soundness Property
Similar to the case for other primitives, the first property
we want is soundness, defined as follows.
Definition 1. An ASE†† scheme is sound if, for any
(PKr, SKr) = rKeyGen(λ) and (PKs, SKs) = sKeyGen(λ),
the following conditions are satisfied.
1. For any w ∈ W, Decrypt(Encrypt(w,PKr), SKr) = w
always holds.
2. For any ciphertext c, Decrypt(c, SKr) = w if and only
if Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1.
3. For any ciphertext c, Decrypt(c, SKr) = w if and only
if Test2(c, w, t∗,s, SKs) = 1.
In the above definition, the first condition means that the
encryption/decryption functionality works well. The sec-
ond and the third conditions define the bilateral consistency
property between the decryption and test algorithms.
The ”if” condition guarantees that any matched ciphertext
by the test algorithms can be successfully decrypted and the
resulted plaintext will be equal to that assumed in the test
algorithms. For instance, if a test algorithm indicates c is
an encryption of w, then the decryption algorithm will not
output w′ 6= w or an error ⊥. Basically, this property guar-
antees that there is no ”false positive” in the search process.
The ”only if” condition guarantees that if a ciphertext can
be successfully decrypted then the test algorithms should be
able to properly match it. This property guarantees that no
targeted ciphertext will be missed by the test algorithms.
Take the encrypted email retrieval and archive scenario as
example, this property is crucial for the email server not to
miss any malicious contents in the encrypted emails.
3. THE SECURITY MODEL
We assume that the message senders possess a valid copy
of the receiver’s public key and the receiver possesses valid
copies of the public keys of the servers. How to securely dis-
tribute these public keys should follow some standard prac-
tice, and we skip the discussion in this paper.
As to the security of an ASE†† scheme, there are two main
privacy concerns.
• One concern is the leakage of plaintext information
from ciphertexts, which is a standard concern for all
encryption schemes. Given ciphertexts, an attacker
can try to deduce information about the encrypted
plaintexts. Particularly, for an ASE†† scheme, knowl-
edge about the (un-encrypted) master trapdoors or
message-dependent trapdoors will provide additional
advantage to the attacker. Therefore, we will consider
the following types of attackers.
– Outside attacker: This type of attacker is not as-
signed with any type of (unencrypted) trapdoors.
– Curious Type-I server S1: This type of attacker
has been assigned with only message-dependent
trapdoors generated under its public key.
– Curious Type-II server S2: This type of attacker
has only been assigned with a master trapdoor
generated under its public key.
– Curious hybrid server Sh: This type of attacker
has been assigned with a master trapdoor and
message-dependent trapdoors generated under its
public key.
It is clear that a hybrid server is more powerful than
others. However, due to the fact that the data owner
may employ all three types of servers, it is necessary
to consider the maximal level of security against each
of them independently.
• The other concern is information leakage from message-
dependent trapdoors. For example, the Type-I server
S1 receives message-dependent trapdoors so that it
knows which ciphertext matches a received trapdoor.
However, S1 should not know the message encoded
in the trapdoor, or equivalently, S1 should not know
what is the plaintext of the matched ciphertext. Fur-
thermore, any entity other than S1 should not learn
anything about the trapdoor. The same security re-
quirement applies to a hybrid server Sh because it also
gets message-dependent trapdoors from the receiver.
To facilitate our security definitions, we first detail all the
potential oracles accessible to an attacker. Based on our as-
sumption that there is only one server of every type, so that
each key generation oracle (sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2, sKeyGenh)
can only be queried once. Trivially, the key request oracles
can only be queried after the corresponding key generation
oracles have been queried.
• sKeyGen1: The challenger runs the sKeyGen algorithm
to generate (PKs1 , SKs1) for the Type-I server S1, and
returns PKs1 .
• sKeyReq1: The challenger returns SKs1 .
• sKeyGen2: The challenger runs the sKeyGen algorithm
to generate (PKs2 , SKs2) for the Type-II server S2,
and returns PKs2 .
• sKeyReq2: The challenger returns SKs2 .
• sKeyGenh: The challenger runs the sKeyGen algorithm
to generate (PKsh , SKsh) for the hybrid server Sh,
and returns PKsh .
• sKeyReqh: The challenger returns SKsh .
• TrapGen1 query with a message w and PKs as in-
put: The challenger returns TrapGen1(w,PKs, SKr).
In this case s can be either s1 or sh
• TrapGen2 query with a public key PKs: The challenger
returns TrapGen2(PKs, SKr). In this case s can be
either s2 or sh
• rKeyReqr: The challenger returns the receiver’s private
key SKr.
• Decrypt query with input c: The challenger returns
Decrypt(c, SKr).
In the following, we present security definitions with re-
spect to the aforementioned two types of privacy concerns.
3.1 Ciphertext Security Properties
Against an outside attacker, in Definition 2, we define
an IND-CCA property similar to the IND-CCA security for
PKE. Informally, the property says that, given some cipher-
texts and various oracle accesses (including decryption ora-
cle), an attacker cannot learn anything about the plaintexts.
Definition 2. An ASE†† scheme is IND-CCA secure against
an outside attacker if the attacker’s advantage (i.e. |Pr[b′ =
b]− 1
2
|) is negligible in the game shown in Figure 1.
In the attack game, w0, w1 ∈ W and state is some state
information generated by the attacker. In Phase 4, the at-
tacker is not allowed to query the Decrypt oracle with cwb .
In this game, an outside attacker is modeled since it is not
1. (PKr, SKr)
$
← rKeyGen(λ)
2. (w0, w1, state)
$
← A(PKr; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2,Decrypt)
3. b ∈R {0, 1}, cwb = Encrypt(wb, PKr)
4. b′
$
← A(PKr, state, cwb ; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2,Decrypt)
Figure 1: IND-CCA Security
allowed to query any server’s private key through sKeyReq1,
sKeyReq2, or sKeyReqh. In practice, an outside attacker can
eavesdrop on the transmission of (encrypted) trapdoors, so
that we offer it access to both trapdoor generation oracles
with its own inputs.
Remark 1. To define the IND-CPA security against an
outside attacker, we only need to disable the Decrypt oracle
in the game shown in Figure 1. In fact, if an ASE†† scheme
is secure under Definition 3 and Definition 7 (given below),
then it is automatically IND-CPA secure. Due to the limit
of space, we put the proof of this result in the full version of
this paper.
Against a curious Type-I server S1, in Definition 3, we de-
fine a ciphertext indistinguishability (CI) security property
similar to the security definition of PEKS [4]. Informally,
this property says that, given some ciphertexts for which S1
has not obtained the corresponding message-dependent trap-
doors, then it cannot learn anything about the plaintexts.
Definition 3. An ASE†† scheme achieves CI security
against a curious Type-I server S1, if the attacker’s advan-
tage (i.e. |Pr[b′ = b] − 1
2
|) is negligible in the game shown
in Figure 2.
1. (PKr, SKr)
$
← rKeyGen(λ)
2. (w0, w1, state)
$
← A(PKr; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReq1)
3. b ∈R {0, 1}, cwb = Encrypt(wb, PKr)
4. b′
$
← A(PKr, state, cwb ; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReq1)
Figure 2: CI Security against a Type-I Server
In the attack game, w0, w1 ∈ W and state is some state
information generated by the attacker. In step 2 and 4, the
TrapGen1 oracle should have not been queried with (w0, PKs1)
or (w1, PKs1). In this game, a Type-I server is modeled
since the attacker is allowed to obtain SKs1 through a sKeyReq1
query, but has no access to SKs2 or SKsh . The oracle access
to message-dependent trapdoors for any messages except for
w0 and w1 is indeed a big privilege for the attacker. Most ex-
isting IND-CPA secure PKE schemes, such as ElGamal [6],
normally allow some sort of homomorphism, so that they
will not be secure if directly used in constructing an ASE††
scheme. As an example, it is easy to verify that the PKEDS
scheme in [9] is not secure under this definition.
Against a curious hybrid server Sh, we define a special CI
security property. Compared with Definition 2 and Defini-
tion 3, the speciality lies in that the challenger randomly
chooses the challenge messages w0, w1 instead of letting the
attacker do. The rationale is that, for a curious hybrid server
Sh, if it can choose the messages then it can easily tell which
message is encrypted by running the Test2 algorithm.
Definition 4. An ASE†† scheme achieves CI security
against a curious hybrid server Sh, if the attacker’s advan-
tage (i.e. |Pr[b′ = b] − 1
2
|) is negligible in the game shown
in Figure 3.
1. (PKr, SKr)
$
← rKeyGen(λ)
2. state
$
← A(PKr; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2, sKeyGenh,
TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReqh)
3. b ∈R {0, 1}, w0, w1 ∈R W,
cb = (Encrypt(w0, PKr),Encrypt(wb, PKr))
4. b′
$
← A(PKr, state, cb; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReqh)
Figure 3: CI Security against a Hybrid Server
In the attack game, state is some state information gener-
ated by the attacker. In this game, a hybrid server is mod-
eled since the attacker is allowed to obtain SKsh through a
sKeyReqh query, but has no access to SKs1 or SKs2 . This
property guarantees that, given some ciphertexts, the at-
tacker can neither recover the plaintexts nor find the equality
relationship of the plaintexts. Therefore, it provides much
stronger security guarantee than the standard one-wayness
property used in [9] and the enhanced one-wayness property
by Bellare, Boldyreva and O’Neill [2].
Similarly, we can define a special CI security property
against a curious Type-II server, as shown in Definition 5.
It is clear that if an ASE†† scheme is secure under Definition
4 then it is also secure under Definition 5.
Definition 5. An ASE†† scheme achieves CI security
against a curious Type-II server S2, if the attacker’s advan-
tage (i.e. |Pr[b′ = b] − 1
2
|) is negligible in the game shown
in Figure 3, where the sKeyReqh oracle is replaced with the
sKeyReq2 oracle.
Remark 2. It is worth noting that the security properties
defined in Definition 4 and 5 only make sense when the mes-
sage space of the encryption scheme is not polynomial size.
when the message space is polynomial size, the attacker can
perform brute-force attacks. This fact is also true for Defi-
nition 6.
3.2 Trapdoor Security Properties
In Definition 6, we define the universal trapdoor one-
wayness property. The property guarantees that no entity
can recover the message encoded in a message-dependent
trapdoor. Note that this will require the message space W
not to be polynomial size. In the attack game, an outside at-
tacker and various servers are modeled because the attacker
can obtain the private keys (SKs1 , SKs2 , SKsh) through the
key request oracles (sKeyReq1, sKeyReq2, sKeyReqh).
Definition 6. An ASE†† scheme achieves universal trap-
door one-wayness if the attacker’s advantage (i.e. Pr[w =
w′]) is negligible in the game shown in Figure 4. Note that
the output value t in Phase 2 can be either 1, or 2, or h.
1. (PKr, SKr)
$
← rKeyGen(λ)
2. (t, state)
$
← A(PKr; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2, sKeyGenh,
TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReq1, sKeyReq2, sKeyReqh)
3. w ∈R W, tw,st = TrapGen1(w,PKst , SKr)
4. w′
$
← A(PKr, state, tw,st ; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReq1, sKeyReq2,
sKeyReqh, rKeyReqr)
Figure 4: Universal Trapdoor One-wayness
To further strengthen the universal trapdoor one-wayness
property, in Definition 7, we define the message-dependent
trapdoor indistinguishability property. Informally, the prop-
erty guarantees that, for the Type-I server S1 or the hy-
brid server Sh, no other entity can learn anything about
the messages encoded in message-dependent trapdoors gen-
erated under its public key.
Definition 7. An ASE†† scheme achieves trapdoor in-
distinguishability if the attacker’s advantage (i.e. |Pr[b′ =
b]− 1
2
|) is negligible in the game shown in Figure 5.
1. (PKr, SKr)
$
← rKeyGen(λ)
2. (w0, w1, t, state)
$
← A(PKr; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2,
sKeyGenh,TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReqt′ , sKeyReq2)
3. b ∈R {0, 1}, twb = TrapGen1(wb, PKst , SKr)
4. b′
$
← A(PKr, state, twb ; sKeyGen1, sKeyGen2, sKeyGenh,
TrapGen1,TrapGen2, sKeyReqt′ , sKeyReq2, rKeyReqr)
Figure 5: Trapdoor Indistinguishability
In the attack game, w0, w1 ∈ W, the values t, t
′ are chosen
(by the attacker) from {1, h} and t 6= t′, and state is some
state information generated by the attacker. This guaran-
tees that sKeyReqt is not queried in the game. We allow the
attacker to request the receiver’s private key in Phase 2 and
all servers’ private keys except for SKst . It captures our
intention that, even if the receiver’s private key is leaked or
compromised, then the attacker still cannot figure out what
the receiver has searched for. This is similar to the forward
secrecy property in key establishment protocols.
4. IND-CCA SECURE ASE††
In this section, we first briefly mention some attempts, and
then describe a novel ASE†† scheme and analyse its security
properties in our security model.
4.1 Some Attempts
To construct an ASE†† scheme, a very natural direction
is to follow the hybrid method used in [16]. Generically, the
data owner can have two key pairs (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2),
and the ciphertext of a message m is in the form of c =
(c1, c2) = (Encrypt1(m,pk1),Encrypt2(m, pk2)), where c1 can
be used for decryption and c2 can be used for search. With
this methodology, the difficulty lies in that we need to pro-
vide a knowledge proof that c1 and c2 contain the same mes-
sage in order to achieve the soundness property. Moreover,
how to generate master trapdoors and message-dependent
trapdoors is not a straightforward task either. It remains as
an open problem to have a generic construction for ASE††.
Instead of a generic construction, we may follow the semi-
hybrid method in [14]: use a standard PKE scheme as a
main component and employ a key-private IBE scheme to
facilitate trapdoor constructions. In order to achieve the
soundness property, we still need to provide a knowledge
proof to guarantee that the decryption and the test func-
tions are consistent with each other (note that the scheme
in [14] does not satisfy the third requirement in Definition
1). Moreover, it is also an interesting future work to improve
this scheme to achieve IND-CCA security.
4.2 Proposed Scheme and its Soundness
In the proposed scheme, the intuition behind the Encrypt
algorithm is that a message is protected by two layers of en-
cryption (see the element c2). The first layer of encryption
makes use of a hash value of the message and can only be
removed by the receiver, while the second layer makes use of
a hash value of the message and a bilinear pairing technique
and it can only be removed with an appropriate message-
dependent trapdoor or a master trapdoor. The search al-
gorithms (Test1 and Test2) are made possible by employing
the bilinear property of pairings.
• sKeyGen(λ): It generates a key pair (PKs, SKs) for
a standard PKE scheme (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′),
which has the message space M.
• rKeyGen(λ): It generates (PKr, SKr) as follows.
1. Generate the pairing parameters: groupG of prime
order p, a bilinear map eˆ: G×G→ GT , randomly
chosen generators g1 and g2 of G.
2. Select a symmetric key encryption scheme (Enc,Dec)
whose key space isM, and select three hash func-
tions: H1 : GT → G, H2 : G → G, and H3 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ.
3. Select x1, x2 ∈R Zp and generate the receiver’s
key pair (PKr, SKr) where PKr = (g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 )
and SKr = (x1, x2).
Besides PKr, the pairing parameters (G,GT , eˆ, p, g1, g2),
symmetric key encryption scheme (Enc,Dec), and hash
functions H1, H2, and H3 should be made public. The
receiver’s message space W is G.
• Encrypt(w,PKr): It selects r1, r2 ∈R Zp and generates
a ciphertext cw = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) as follows.
c1 = g
r1
1 , c2 = H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r1)) · H2(w)
r1 · w,
c3 = g
r2
2 , c4 = g
x2r2
2 · H2(w)
r1 ,
c5 = H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r1)).
• Decrypt(cw, SKr): It parses cw as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and
computes w = c2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
))·
c4
c
x2
3
, and outputs w if the
following equalities hold.
eˆ(c1,H2(w)) = eˆ(g1,
c4
c
x2
3
))
c5 = H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
))
If either equality does not hold, the algorithm outputs
an error symbol ⊥.
• TrapGen1(w,PKs, SKr): It selects y ∈R Zp and com-
putes the message-dependent trapdoor tw,s = (v7, v8)
as follows.
v0 = H2(w)
x1y , v1 = H2(w)
x1 , v2 = eˆ(g
x1y
1 , w
−1),
v3 = g
x1y
1 , v4 = g
x1x2y
1 , v5 = H2(w),
k1 ∈R M, v7 = Enc(v0||v1||v2||v3||v4||v5, k1),
v8 = Encrypt
′(k1, PKs).
• Test1(c, tw,s, SKs): It performs as follows.
1. Parse c as (c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4, c
′
5) and tw,s as (v7, v8).
2. Decrypt v8 to obtain k1 and decrypt v7 to recover
v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5.
3. Output 1 if the following equalities hold, and out-
put 0 otherwise.
eˆ(v3, c
′
4)
eˆ(v4, c′3)
= v2 · eˆ(v3,
c′2
H1(eˆ(c′1, v1))
) = eˆ(c′1, v0) (1)
c
′
5 = H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||v5||eˆ(c
′
1, v1)) (2)
• TrapGen2(PKs, SKr): It generates a master trapdoor
t∗,s = (u1, u2), where z ∈R Zp, k2 ∈R M,
u1 = Enc(x1||g
z
1 ||g
x2·z
1 , k2), u2 = Encrypt
′(k2, PKs).
• Test2(c, w, t∗,s, SKs): It performs as follows.
1. Parse c as (c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4, c
′
5) and t∗,s as (u1, u2).
2. Decrypt u2 to obtain k2 and decrypt u1 to recover
(x1, g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 ).
3. Output 1 if the following equalities hold, and out-
put 0 otherwise.
eˆ(gz1 ,
c′4
c′2
H1(eˆ(c
′
1,H2(w)
x1 ))·w
) = eˆ(gx2·z1 , c
′
3) (3)
eˆ(g1,
c′2
H1(eˆ(c′1,H2(w)
x1)) · w
) = eˆ(c′1,H2(w)) (4)
c
′
5 = H3(α||H2(w)||eˆ(c
′
1,H2(w)
x1)), (5)
where α = c′1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4.
Remark 3. The element c5 in the ciphertext is solely for
the purpose of achieving IND-CCA security against an out-
side attacker. To achieve IND-CPA security against an out-
side attacker and preserve all other security properties, we
can eliminate c5 in Encrypt, the verification of c5 in Decrypt,
the verifications of c′5 in Test1 and Test2 in the above scheme.
Moreover, the element v5 in TrapGen1 can also be eliminated.
Due to the limit of space, we put the proof of this simplified
scheme in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 1. The proposed ASE†† scheme is sound ac-
cording to Definition 1.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need to show that the
requirements in Definition 1 are satisfied.
Referring to the Encrypt algorithm, given a ciphertext
cw = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5), it is straightforward to verify that
the following equalities hold with probability 1.
c2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
)) · c4
c
x2
3
= w, eˆ(c1,H2(w)) = eˆ(g1,
c4
c
x2
3
)),
c5 = H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
)).
Referring to the definition of the Decrypt algorithm, the
above equalities means that Decrypt(cw, SKr) = w. As a
result, the first requirement in Definition 1 is satisfied.
As to the second requirement, we prove two things.
• If Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds, we prove that the equal-
ity Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1 holds. Let c = (c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4, c
′
5).
Referring to the definition of the Decrypt algorithm,
Decrypt(c, SKr) = w implies the following equalities.
c′2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)) ·
c′4
(c′3)
x2
= w (6)
eˆ(c′1,H2(w)) = eˆ(g1,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)) (7)
c
′
5 = H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||H2(w)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)). (8)
Based on these equalities and the definition of tw,s, we
have the following.
eˆ(v3, c
′
4)
eˆ(v4, c′3)
=
eˆ(gx1y1 , c
′
4)
eˆ(gx1y1 , (c
′
3)
x2)
= eˆ(gx1y1 ,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)
= eˆ(c′1, v0)
v2 · eˆ(v3,
c′2
H1(eˆ(c′1, v1))
)
= eˆ(gx1y1 , w
−1) · eˆ(gx1y1 ,
c′2
H1(eˆ(c′1,H2(w)
x1))
)
= eˆ(gx1y1 , w
−1) · eˆ(gx1y1 ,
c′2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)) · w
)
= eˆ(gx1y1 ,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)
= eˆ(c′1, v0)
c
′
5 = H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||v5||eˆ(c
′
1, v1))
Based on the definition of Test1, we can conclude that
Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1 holds.
• If Test1(c, tw,s, SKs) = 1 holds, we prove that the
equalityDecrypt(c, SKr) = w holds. Let c = (c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4, c
′
5),
we can re-write it in the following form.
c
′
1 = g
r′1
1 , c
′
2 = H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r′1)) · H2(w)
r′1 · w∗,
c
′
3 = g
r′2
2 , c
′
4 = g
x2r
′
2
2 · H2(w)
r′1 · w†, c′5 = c
′
5,
for some r′1, r
′
2, w
∗, w†. The equalities associated with
labels (1) and (2) in the definition of Test1 lead to the
following equalities.
eˆ(gx1y1 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · H2(w)
r′1 · w†)
eˆ(gx1x2y1 , g
r′2
2 )
= eˆ(g
r′1
1 ,H2(w)
x1y),
eˆ(gx1y1 , w
−1) · eˆ(gx1y1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r′1)) · H2(w)
r′1 · w∗
H1(eˆ(g
r′1
1 ,H2(w)
x1))
)
= eˆ(g
r′1
1 ,H2(w)
x1y),
c
′
5 = H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||H2(w)||eˆ(c
′
1,H2(w)
x1)).
The first equality implies w† = 1, and the second
equality implies that w∗ = w. Clearly, Decrypt(c, SKr) =
w holds.
As to the third requirement, we prove two things.
• If Decrypt(c, SKr) = w holds, we prove that the equal-
ity Test2(c, w, t∗,s, SKs) = 1 holds. Let c = (c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4, c
′
5).
Based on these equalities associated with labels (6),(7),(8)
and the definition of t∗,s, we have the following.
eˆ(gz1 ,
c′4
c′2
H1(eˆ(c
′
1,H2(w)
x1 ))·w
) = eˆ(gz1 ,
c′4
c′2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c′4
(c′
3
)x2
))·w
)
= eˆ(gz1 ,
c′4
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)
= eˆ(gz1 , (c
′
3)
x2)
= eˆ(gx2·z1 , c
′
3)
eˆ(g1,
c′2
H1(eˆ(c′1,H2(w)
x1)) · w
)
= eˆ(g1,
c′2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)) · w
)
= eˆ(g1,
c′4
(c′3)
x2
)
= eˆ(c′1,H2(w))
c
′
5 = H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||H2(w)||eˆ(c
′
1,H2(w)
x1)).
As a result, the equalities associated with labels (3),
(4), and (5) in the definition of Test2 hold, we can
conclude that Test2(c, w, t∗,s, SKs) = 1.
• If Test2(c, w, t∗,s, SKs) = 1, we prove thatDecrypt(c, SKr) =
w. Let c = (c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4, c
′
5), we can re-write it in the
following form.
c
′
1 = g
r′1
1 , c
′
2 = H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r′1)) · H2(w)
r′1 · w∗,
c
′
3 = g
r′2
2 , c
′
4 = g
x2r
′
2
2 · H2(w)
r′1 · w†, c′5 = c
′
5,
for some r′1, r
′
2, w
∗, w†. The equalities associated with
labels (3), (4), and (5) in the definition of Test2 lead
to the following equalities.
eˆ(gz1 ,
g
x2r
′
2
2 · H2(w)
r′1 · w†
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r′1 ))·H2(w)
r′1 ·w∗
H1(eˆ(g
r′1
1 ,H2(w)
x1 ))·w
) = eˆ(gx2·z1 , g
r′2
2 ),
eˆ(g1,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w)
r′1)) · H2(w)
r′1 · w∗
H1(eˆ(g
r′1
1 ,H2(w)
x1)) · w
) = eˆ(g
r′1
1 ,H2(w)),
c
′
5 = H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||H2(w)||eˆ(c
′
1,H2(w)
x1)).
The second equality implies that w∗ = w. Based on
this fact, it is straightforward to verify that the first
equality implies w† = 1. Based on the proof of the
first requirement, it is clear that Decrypt(c, SKr) = w
holds.
All three conditions required by Definition 1 hold, the
theorem follows.
4.3 Security Analysis
Let the pairing parameters param = (G,GT , eˆ, p) be de-
fined in the same way as in the rKeyGen algorithm. We
briefly review the Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption [3]
and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption [5].
The DLIN assumption is as follows: any P.P.T. attacker
adv can only distinguish T0 and T1 with a negligible advan-
tage |Pr[Adv(param,T0) = 1] − Pr[Adv(param,T1) = 1]|,
where x, y ∈R Zp, ga, gb, gc, θ ∈R G, and
T0 = (ga, gb, gc, g
x
a , g
y
b , g
x+y
c ),
T1 = (ga, gb, gc, g
x
a , g
y
b , θ).
The BDH assumption is as follows: given (param, g, gx,
gy, gz) where x, y, z ∈R Zp and g is a generator of G, any
P.P.T. attacker adv can only compute eˆ(g, g)x·y·z with a neg-
ligible probability.
In proving one of the theorems, we also use the assumption
that inverting the bilinear map eˆ is hard, and this problem
has been shown to be equivalent to the discrete logarithm
problem in G and GT [10, 15]. Certainly, this assumption is
weaker than both DLIN and BDH assumptions.
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme achieves CI security
against a curious Type-I server S1 in the random oracle
model given: (1) (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec)
are IND-CPA secure; (2) the DLIN and BDH assumptions.
Proof. Under Definition 3, let Game0 be the attack game
defined in Figure 2. Let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ0.
Next, consider a game Game1, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game0, except for the follow-
ing. For any TrapGen2 query with the input PKs, the chal-
lenger returns t∗,s = (u1, u2), generated as follows: select
k′2, k
′′
2 ∈R M, γ ∈R Zp and α, β ∈R G, compute u1 =
Enc(γ||α||β, k′1) and u2 = Encrypt
′(k′′2 , PKs). In this game,
let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ1. Based on the IND-CPA
definition for encryption schemes, |ǫ1 − ǫ0| is negligible if
both (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec) are IND-
CPA secure.
Next, consider a game Game2, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game1, except for the following.
• At the beginning of the game, the challenger chooses
y∗ ∈R Zp and constructs a list for the random oracle
H2. If H2 is queried with input w, the challenger first
checks the list. If there is already a hash value for w,
the challenger returns this value; otherwise, the chal-
lenger chooses rw ∈R Zp and returns g
rw
1 as the hash
value, and then adds (w, grw1 , rw) to the list.
• For a TrapGen1 query with input w and PKs, the
challenger generates the message-dependent trapdoor
tw,s = (v7, v8) as follows.
yw ∈R Zp, v0 = g
x1·y
∗·rw·yw
1 , v1 = g
x1·rw
1 ,
v2 = eˆ(g
x1·y
∗·yw
1 , w
−1), v3 = g
x1·y
∗·yw
1 , v4 = g
x1·x2·y
∗·yw
1 ,
v5 = g
rw
1 , k1 ∈R M, v8 = Encrypt
′(k1, PKs),
v7 = Enc(v0||v1||v2||v3||v4||v5, k1).
In this game, let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ2. Given
that H2 is modeled as a random oracle, this game is identical
to Game1 so that ǫ2 = ǫ1.
Next, consider a game Game3, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game2, except that the chal-
lenge cwb = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) is generated as follows.
r1, r2 ∈R Zp, R ∈R G2, R
′ ∈R {0, 1}
λ
, c1 = g
r1
1 ,
c2 = R·H2(wb)
r1 ·wb, c3 = g
r2
2 , c4 = g
x2·r2
2 ·H2(wb)
r1 , c5 = R
′
.
In Game3, let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ3. If H1 and
H3 are modeled as random oracles, then Game3 differs from
Game2 only if eˆ(gx11 ,H2(wb)
r1) has been queried to H1 or
∗||eˆ(gx11 ,H2(w)
r1)||∗ has been queried to H3 where the *
can be anything. Based on the Difference lemma [11] and
CLAIM 1 (stated and proven below), |ǫ3 − ǫ2| is negligible
based on the BDH assumption.
Next, consider a new game Game4, where the challenger
performs in the same way as in Game3, except that the
challenge cwb = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) is generated as follows.
r1, r2 ∈R Zp, R ∈R G2, R
′ ∈R {0, 1}
λ
, c1 = g
r1
1 , c2 = R,
c3 = g
r2
2 , c4 = g
x2r2
2 · H2(wb)
r1 , c5 = R
′
.
Clearly, Game4 is identical to Game3. Let the attacker’s
advantage be ǫ4, so that we have ǫ4 = ǫ3. Based on its
definition, ǫ4 can also be regarded as the attacker’s advan-
tage in distinguishing X0 and X1, where x1, x2, y
∗, r1, r2 ∈R
Zp. Other public parameters (e.g. pairing parameters and
w0, w1) are described in the game.
• X0 = (g1, g2, g
x1·y
∗
1 , g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
x1·x2·y
∗
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·
H2(w0)
r1)
• X1 = (g1, g2, g
x1·y
∗
1 , g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
x1·x2·y
∗
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·
H2(w1)
r1)
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D1.
Reduction step 2a. D1 is equivalent to distinguish Y0 and
Y1, where x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp and h1 ∈R G. Note that g
x1·y
∗
1 is
set to be h1 and g
x1
1 is removed.
• Y0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · H2(w0)
r1)
• Y1 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · H2(w1)
r1)
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D2.
Reduction step 2b. D2 can be reduced to distinguish Z0
and Z1, where x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, h2, δ ∈R G.
• Z0 = (g1, g2, h1, h2, g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · h
r1
2 )
• Z1 = (g1, g2, h1, h2, g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , δ)
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D3.
Reduction step 2c. D3 is equivalent to distinguish U0 and
U1, where x2, x3, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, δ ∈R G. Note that h2 is
replaced by gx32 .
• U0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x3
2 , g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · g
x3r1
2 )
• U1 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x3
2 , g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , δ)
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D4.
Reduction step 2d. D4 is equivalent to distinguish V0 and
V1, where α, x3, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, h2, δ ∈R G. Note that x2
is set to be α+ x3.
• V0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x3
2 , g
α+x3
2 , h
α+x3
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
αr2+x3(r1+r2)
2 )
• V1 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x3
2 , g
α+x3
2 , h
α+x3
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , δ)
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D5.
Reduction step 2e. D5 can be reduced to distinguish W0
and W1, where x3, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1, h2, δ ∈R G. The re-
duction is based on the fact that it is straightforward to
construct a D5’s instance from W0 and W1.
• W0 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x3
2 , h
x3
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x3(r1+r2)
2 )
• W1 = (g1, g2, h1, g
x3
2 , h
x3
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , δ)
Let this distinguishing problem be referred to as D6.
Reduction step 2f. D6 can be reduced to the DLIN prob-
lem in G. The reduction is because from a DLIN instance
we can construct a D6 instance as follows, where γ ∈R Zp.
• T ′0 = (ga, gb, g
γ
b , gc, g
γ
c , g
x
a , g
y
b , g
x+y
c )
• T ′1 = (ga, gb, g
γ
b , gc, g
γ
c , g
x
a , g
y
b , θ)
Based on all above reductions, in Game4, the attacker’s
advantage ǫ4 is negligible based on the DLIN assumption.
As a result, ǫ0 is negligible based on all the assumptions
mentioned in the theorem.
Claim 1. In Game3 of the proof of Theorem 2, the at-
tacker can only succeed in querying H1 with eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(wb)
r1)
for a negligible probability based on the BDH assumption.
Proof. In Game3, besides the public parameters, the
challenger only needs (gx1·y
∗
1 , g
x1·x2·y
∗
1 ) in order to answer
the attacker’s oracle queries. The computational problem
(referred to as P1) is defined as follows.
• Input: (g1, g2, g
x1·y
∗
1 ,H2(wb), g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
x1·x2·y
∗
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 ,
g
x2r2
2 ·H2(wb)
r1), where x1, x2, y
∗, r1, r2 ∈R Zp. Other
public parameters are described in the game.
• Output: eˆ(gx11 ,H2(wb)
r1).
The problem P1 can be equivalently rephrased as follows,
referred to as P2. Note that gx1·y
∗
1 is set to be h1 and H2(wb)
is set to be h2.
• Input: (g1, g2, h1, h2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , h
x2
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·h
r1
2 ),
where x1, x2, r1, r2 ∈R Zp, h1 ∈R G and h2 ∈R G.
• Output: eˆ(gx11 , h
r1
2 ) or eˆ(g
x1
1 , g
x2r2
2 ).
The problem P2 can be reduced to the following problem
(referred to as P3).
• Input: (g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
x2
1 , g
r2
2 ), where x1, x2, r1, r2 ∈R
Zp.
• Output: eˆ(gx11 , g
x2r2
2 ).
The reduction is based on the fact that, from a P3’s in-
stance (g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
x2
1 g
r2
2 ), we can construct a P2’s in-
stance (g1, g2, g
α
1 , g
β−r2
2 , g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , (g
x2
1 )
α, g
x2+γ
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2β+βγ−r2γ
2 )
for α, β, γ ∈R Zp. Furthermore, the problem P3 can be re-
duced to the following problem (referred to as P4).
• Input: (g2, g
x1
2 , g
x2
2 , g
r2
2 ), where x1, x2, r2 ∈R Zp.
• Output: eˆ(g2, g2)
x1·x2·r2 .
The reduction is based on the fact that, from a P4’s in-
stance (g2, g
x1
2 , g
x2
2 , g
r2
2 ), we can construct a P2’s instance
(gτ2 , g2, g
x1·τ
2 , g
x2
2 , g
x2·τ
2 g
r2
2 ) for α, β, γ ∈R Zp. P4 is indeed
the BDH problem. The claim now follows.
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme achieves IND-CCA se-
curity against an outside attacker in the random oracle model
given: (1) (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec) are
IND-CPA secure; (2) the DLIN and BDH assumptions.
Proof. Under Definition 2, let Game0 be the attack game
defined in Figure 1. Let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ0.
Next, consider a game Game1, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game0, except for the follow-
ing. For any TrapGen1 query with the input w and PKs,
the challenger returns tw,s = (v7, v8), generated as follows:
select v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, k1 uniformly at random from their
corresponding domains, compute
v7 = Enc(v0||v1||v2||v3||v4||v5, k1)
and v8 = Encrypt
′(k1, PKs). In this game, let the attacker’s
advantage be ǫ1. Based on the IND-CPA definition for en-
cryption schemes, |ǫ1 − ǫ0| is negligible if both (KeyGen
′,
Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec) are IND-CPA secure.
Next, consider a game Game2, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game1, except for the follow-
ing. For any TrapGen2 query with the input PKs, the chal-
lenger returns t∗,s = (u1, u2) which is generated as follows:
select k′2, k
′′
2 ∈R M, γ ∈R Zp and α, β ∈R G1, compute
u1 = Enc(γ||α||β, k
′
2) and u2 = Encrypt
′(k′′2 , PKs). In this
game, let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ2. Based on the IND-
CPA definition for encryption schemes, |ǫ2− ǫ1| is negligible
if both (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec) are IND-
CPA secure.
Next, consider a game Game3, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game2, except that it answers
the Decrypt oracle as follows. Given a ciphertext c, the chal-
lenger parses it as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and performs as follows.
1. Compute w = c2
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
))·
c4
c
x2
3
.
2. If c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
) has not been queried
to H3 or w has not been queried to H2, abort by out-
putting an error symbol ⊥. In addition, if there are
different inputs to either oracle and result in the same
output, abort by outputting an error symbol ⊥.
3. If c5 = H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,
c4
c
x2
3
)) and
eˆ(c1,H2(w)) = eˆ(g1,
c4
c
x2
3
)) output w. Otherwise, abort
by outputting an error symbol ⊥.
This game is identical to Game2 unless the following event
occurs: there is a ciphertext c, the Decrypt algorithm out-
puts w but the challenger returns ⊥. If H2 and H3 are mod-
eled as random oracles, the event occurs with a negligible
probability. In this game, let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ3.
Based on the Difference lemma [11], |ǫ3 − ǫ2| is negligible in
the random oracle model.
Next, consider a game Game4, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game3, except that it answers
the Decrypt oracle as follows. Given a ciphertext c, the chal-
lenger parses it as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and performs as follows.
1. Check whether there is an input c1||c2||c3||c4||α1||α2
to H3, where α1 ∈ G and α2 ∈ GT and there is an
input w′ ∈ G to H2 such that
c5 = H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||α1||α2),H2(w
′) = α1.
If there is no such inputs or there are more than one
inputs satisfying the equalities, aborts by outputting
an error symbol ⊥.
2. Compute β = c2
H1(α2)·w′
.
3. Check whether the following equalities hold.
eˆ(gx11 , β) = α2, eˆ(
c4
β
, g2) = eˆ(g
x2
2 , c3),
eˆ(c1,H2(w
′)) = eˆ(g1, β).
If so, output w′, otherwise aborts by outputting an
error symbol ⊥.
This game is identical to Game3, but the receiver’s private
keys are not required to answer the oracle queries. In this
game, let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ4, so that ǫ3 = ǫ4.
Next, consider a game Game5, where the challenger per-
forms in the same way as in Game4, except that the chal-
lenge cwb = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) is generated as follows.
r1, r2 ∈R Zp, R ∈R G2, R
′ ∈R {0, 1}
λ
, c1 = g
r1
1 ,
c2 = R·H2(wb)
r1 ·wb, c3 = g
r2
2 , c4 = g
x2·r2
2 ·H2(wb)
r1 , c5 = R
′
.
In this game, let the attacker’s advantage be ǫ5. Note the
fact that the challenger answers Decrypt oracle access with-
out the knowledge of the receiver’s private keys (i.e. Decrypt
oracle access gives the attacker no actual privilege), therefore
an outside attacker infact has less privilege than a curious
Type-I server. Based on the analysis from Game3 and the
following games in the proof of Theorem 2, we can conclude
that ǫ5 is negligible based on the the DLIN assumption and
the BDH assumption. The theorem now follows.
Theorem 4. The proposed scheme achieves CI security
against a hybrid server Sh in the random oracle model given:
(1) (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec) are IND-CPA
secure; (2) the DLIN and BDH assumptions.
Proof. Under Definition 4, suppose the attacker’s ad-
vantage is ǫ0 in the attack game defined in Figure 3. With
respect to the proposed scheme, it is clear that, given a
master trapdoor t∗,s, an attacker can simulate the TrapGen1
oracle by itself. As a result, ǫ0 can also be regarded as the
attacker’s advantage in distinguishing X0 and X1, where
x1, x2, r1, r2, r
′
1, r
′
2, z ∈R Zp, and w0, w1 ∈R G, and any
c1, c2, c3, c4, c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4. Other public parameters are de-
scribed in the game.
• X0 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w0)
r1))·H2(w0)
r1 ·w0, g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·H2(w0)
r1 ,
H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w0)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w0)
r1)), g
r′1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w0)
r′1))·H2(w0)
r′1 ·w0, g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 ·H2(w0)
r′1 ,
H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||H2(w0)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w0)
r′1)))
• X1 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w0)
r1))·H2(w0)
r1 ·w0, g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·H2(w0)
r1 ,
H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||H2(w0)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w0)
r1)), g
r′1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w1)
r′1))·H2(w1)
r′1 ·w1, g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 ·H2(w1)
r′1 ,
H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||H2(w1)||eˆ(g
x1
1 ,H2(w1)
r′1)))
Let the above distinguishing problem be denoted as I1.
Reduction step 4a. I1 is equivalent to distinguish Y0 and
Y1, where x1, x2, r1, r2, r
′
1, r
′
2, z ∈R Zp and w0, w1, h0, h1 ∈R
G, and any c1, c2, c3, c4, c
′
1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4. Note that H2(w0) is set
to be h0 and H2(w1) is set to be h1.
• Y0 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r1
0 )) · h
r1
0 · w0, g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · h
r1
0 ,
H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||h0||eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r1
0 )), g
r′1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r′1
0 )) · h
r′1
0 · w0, g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
0 ,
H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||h0||eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r′1
0 )))
• Y1 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r1
0 )) · h
r1
0 · w0, g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · h
r1
0 ,
H3(c1||c2||c3||c4||h0||eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r1
0 )), g
r′1
1 ,
H1(eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r′1
1 )) · h
r′1
1 · w1, g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
1 ,
H3(c
′
1||c
′
2||c
′
3||c
′
4||h1||eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r′1
1 )))
Let this distinguishing problem be denoted as I2.
Reduction step 4b. Let Y ′0 and Y
′
1 be the following. Straight-
forwardly, CLAIM 2 (stated and proven below) also implies
that, for any P.P.T. attacker, given Y ′1 , it can only com-
pute eˆ(gx11 , h
r1
0 ) and eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r′1
1 ) with a negligible probability
based on the BDH assumption.
• Y ′0 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·
h
r1
0 , g
r′1
1 , g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
0 )
• Y ′1 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·
h
r1
0 , g
r′1
1 , g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
1 )
As a result, I2 is equivalent to distinguish Y ′0 and Y
′
1 based
on the BDH assumption in the random oracle model. Let
this distinguishing problem be denoted as I3.
Reduction step 4c. I3 is equivalent to distinguish Z0 and
Z1, where x2, r1, r2, r
′
1, r
′
2, z ∈R Zp and h0, h1 ∈R G. Note
that x1, g
x1 are removed.
• Z0 = (g1, g2, g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·h
r1
0 , g
r′1
1 , g
r′2
2 ,
g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
0 )
• Z1 = (g1, g2, g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·h
r1
0 , g
r′1
1 , g
r′2
2 ,
g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
1 )
Let this distinguishing problem be denoted as I4.
Reduction step 4d. I4 can be reduced to distinguish U0 and
U1, where x2, r
′
1, r
′
2, z ∈R Zp and h0, h1 ∈R G. The reduc-
tion is based on the fact that we can construct gr11 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·
h
r1
0 based on h0.
• U0 = (g1, g2, g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , h0, g
r′1
1 , g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
0 )
• U1 = (g1, g2, g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , h0, g
r′1
1 , g
r′2
2 , g
x2r
′
2
2 · h
r′1
1 )
Let this distinguishing problem be denoted as I5.
It is easy to see that I5 can be reduced to the distinguish-
ing problem D2 defined at Reduction step 2a. in the proof
of Theorem 2 (based on a D2’s instance, by adding either
H2(w0) or H2(w1), we can obtain an I5’s instance). There-
fore, from the proof of Theorem 2, a P.P.T. attacker can
only have a negligible advantage in solving I5 based on the
DLIN assumption. As a result, ǫ0 is negligible based on all
the assumptions mentioned in the theorem.
Claim 2. In the proof of Theorem 4, for any P.P.T. at-
tacker, given either Y ′0 , it can only compute eˆ(g
x1
1 , h
r1
0 ) and
eˆ(gx11 , h
r′1
0 ) with a negligible probability based on the BDH
assumption.
Proof. Due to the symmetry, we only need to prove that,
for any P.P.T. attacker, given either Y ′0 , it can only compute
eˆ(gx11 , h
r1
0 ) with a negligible probability.
Reduction step a1.Given (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 ,
g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · h
r1
0 ), we can construct Y
∗
0 as follows, where
α, β ∈R Zp. Y
∗
0 = (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 , g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 ·
h
r1
0 , g
r1α
1 , g
r2α+β
2 , (g
x2r2
2 ·h
r1
0 )
α·gx2β2 ). It is easy to verify that
Y ∗0 has an identical distribution to that of Y
′
0 . So, the prob-
lem can be reduced to: given (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r1
1 ,
g
r2
2 , g
x2r2
2 · h
r1
0 ), the attacker computes eˆ(g
x1
1 , g
x2r2
2 ).
Reduction step a2. The above problem can be reduced to:
given (x1, g1, g2, g
x1
1 , g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r2
2 ), the attacker com-
putes eˆ(gx11 , g
x2r2
2 ).
Reduction step a3. The above problem can be reduced to:
given (g1, g2, g
x2
2 , g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 , g
r2
2 ), the attacker computes
eˆ(g1, g
x2r2
2 ).
Reduction step a4. This above reduced problem is equiva-
lent to: given (fx31 , g2, g
x2
2 , f1, f
x2
1 , g
r2
2 ), where f1 ∈R G and
x3 ∈R Zp, the attacker can only compute eˆ(f
x3
1 , g
x2r2
2 ) with
a negligible probability. The equivalence is based on the fact
that g1, g
z
1 , g
x2·z
1 are replaced with f
x3
1 , f1, f
x2
1 respectively,
which is simply a change of notation. Referring to the re-
duction from P3 to P4 in the proof of CLAIM 1, this can be
reduced to the BDH problem. The claim follows.
Note that this theorem implies that the proposed scheme
is also secure under Definition 5.
The following theorem is straightforward, so that we skip
a formal proof.
Theorem 5. The proposed scheme achieves universal trap-
door one-wayness under Definition 6, given: (1) the hash
function H2 is one-way; (2) the bilinear map eˆ is one-way.
Theorem 6. The proposed scheme achieves trapdoor in-
distinguishability property if (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and
(Enc,Dec) are IND-CPA secure.
Proof. Under Definition 7, according to the attack game
definition in Figure 5, the attacker can query sKeyReqt′ for
t′ = 1 or t′ = h. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the attacker queries sKeyReq1. This means t = h, and the
challenge twb = (v7, v8) are defined as follows.
y ∈R Zp, v0 = H2(wb)
x1y, v1 = H2(wb)
x1 , v2 = eˆ(g
x1y
1 , w
−1
b ),
v3 = g
x1y
1 , v4 = g
x1x2y
1 , v5 = H2(wb), k1 ∈R M,
v7 = Enc(v0||v1||v2||v3||v4||v5, k1), v8 = Encrypt
′(k1, PKsh).
Note the fact that revealing the receiver’s private key x1, x2
will not affect the security of the encryption schemes, namely
(KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and (Enc,Dec). Without oracle
access to SKsh , the attacker can learn nothing about wb
from twb . Then, the theorem follows.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated the concept of ASE††
and attempted to provide a comprehensive security model
for the primitive. As to the relationships of various secu-
rity properties, the IND-CPA security against an outside at-
tacker is implied by the ciphertext indistinguishability prop-
erty against a Type-I server and the message-dependent
trapdoor indistinguishability property (to be presented in
the full paper due to space limit). Compared with pre-
vious works, such as those from [7, 8, 9], our formulation
defines more flexible functionalities and our security model
reflects a higher level of security guarantees. The security
of the proposed instantiation relies on the standard DLIN
and BDH assumptions in the random oracle model, which
plays an important role in the double encryption structure.
It is an interesting future work to investigate an instantia-
tion in the standard model, namely without using random
oracle. With regard to trapdoor security, we have designed
universal one-wayness property against all attackers. There
is a possibility of replacing it with the augmented notion
proposed in [2] or an even stronger notion similar to the
ciphertext indistinguishability property against Type-II at-
tacker in our security model. We consider this to be another
line of future work.
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